A smart random code injection to mask power analysis based side channel attacks

One of the security issues in embedded system is the ability of an adversary to perform side channel attacks. Power analysis attacks are often very successful, where the power sequence dissipated by the system is observed and analyzed to predict secret keys. In this paper we show a processor architecture, which automatically detects the execution of the most common encryption algorithms, starts to scramble the power waveform by adding randomly placed instructions with random register accesses, and stops injecting instructions when it is safe to do so. Our technique prevents both Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). This approach has less overheads compared to previous solutions and avoids software instrumentation, allowing programmers with no special knowledge to use the system. Our processor model costs an additional area of 1.2%, and an average of 25% in runtime and 28.5% in energy over heads for industry standard cryptographic algorithms.