Title :
Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dominant Retailer
Author :
Yu-yin, Yi ; Jia-mi, Liang
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Manage., Jinan Univ., Guangzhou, China
Abstract :
A closed-loop supply chain (CLSC)game model with a dominant retailer is studied, and the retail price, the product return rate, the profits of CLSC in the centrally coordinated and decentralized decision models are compared. It´s indicated that the decentralized decision always take some efficiency lose, so the centrally coordinate decision get an advantage over the decentralized decision. Therefore, a modified two-part pricing contract is presented to coordinate the closed-loop chain with a dominant retailer.
Keywords :
closed loop systems; decision theory; economic indicators; pricing; supply chain management; CLSC game model; CLSC profits; centrally coordinate decision; centrally coordinated decision models; closed-loop chain; closed-loop supply chain; decentralized decision models; dominant retailer; efficiency lose; pricing contract; product return rate; retail price; Industrial engineering; Information management; Innovation management; Closed-loop Supply Chains; Dominant Retailer; Pricing Coordination;
Conference_Titel :
Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Shenzhen
Print_ISBN :
978-1-61284-450-3
DOI :
10.1109/ICIII.2011.87