Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dominant Retailer

Author

Yu-yin, Yi ; Jia-mi, Liang

Author_Institution

Sch. of Manage., Jinan Univ., Guangzhou, China

Volume

1

fYear

2011

fDate

26-27 Nov. 2011

Firstpage

343

Lastpage

346

Abstract

A closed-loop supply chain (CLSC)game model with a dominant retailer is studied, and the retail price, the product return rate, the profits of CLSC in the centrally coordinated and decentralized decision models are compared. It´s indicated that the decentralized decision always take some efficiency lose, so the centrally coordinate decision get an advantage over the decentralized decision. Therefore, a modified two-part pricing contract is presented to coordinate the closed-loop chain with a dominant retailer.

Keywords

closed loop systems; decision theory; economic indicators; pricing; supply chain management; CLSC game model; CLSC profits; centrally coordinate decision; centrally coordinated decision models; closed-loop chain; closed-loop supply chain; decentralized decision models; dominant retailer; efficiency lose; pricing contract; product return rate; retail price; Industrial engineering; Information management; Innovation management; Closed-loop Supply Chains; Dominant Retailer; Pricing Coordination;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII), 2011 International Conference on

Conference_Location

Shenzhen

Print_ISBN

978-1-61284-450-3

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICIII.2011.87

Filename

6115456