Title :
Logistics Finance incentive mechanism design based on principal-agent theory
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Wuhan Polytech. Univ., Wuhan, China
Abstract :
This paper constructs an incentive logistics finance model based on the principal-agent theory applied to incentive logistics finance mechanism. Through constructing and analyzing model, it concludes that the best effort coefficient of team and the optimal excitation strength of financial institution are determined on the team co-factor, risk aversion, effort cost coefficient and the variance of output. Also it designs the incentive system from the financial institution to the team of logistic enterprise and finance enterprise according to the conclusion. It breaks through the traditional qualitative research and the basic concepts of limited logistics finance and it gives the clear direction and measures on incentives of financial institution in practice.
Keywords :
finance; incentive schemes; logistics; finance enterprise; financial institution; logistic enterprise; logistics finance incentive mechanism design; principal-agent theory; risk aversion; team co-factor; Companies; Contracts; Economics; Finance; Games; Logistics; incentive; logistics finance; logistics finance services; principal-agent theory;
Conference_Titel :
IT in Medicine and Education (ITME), 2011 International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Cuangzhou
Print_ISBN :
978-1-61284-701-6
DOI :
10.1109/ITiME.2011.6130748