Analysis of option incentive of listed company in abnormal economic environment

This paper argues that, there is no doubt in terms of the function and role of option incentive, which, as a system setting, can effectively solve the principal-agent problem resulted from the separation of ownership and control of the company. It is the generally recognized standard as to whether the rights can be exercised, and also the conventional mode of operation of option incentive, that most of the time, the immediate value of option incentive is determined by the company´s stock price of a future point. We believe that under abnormal economic conditions (eg, The coming of an economic crisis) it is highly possible that the real-time stock price obviously does not correspond to the work and performance of the cooperate manager. Hence, it is of practical value to make amendments in changing environment for the option incentive under normal environment. This paper proposes that by selecting the overall performance of a package of cooperate share in the incentive period, moderately excluding irresistible external environmental factors of the corporate executives, and reasonably setting the exercise condition of the manager to conduct option incentive, a more objective evaluation of the work and performance of the manager can be made, based on the theory of competitive advantage and Porter´s “five forces model”. This is the extension of the functioning space and environment of option incentive system, and it will help resolving the blind spot problems incentive options.