Abstract :
In a series of papers, the author has documented the evolution at the Sandia National Laboratories of a solution to the problem of how two mutually deceitful and distrusting parties -- the host and the monitor -- can both trust a data acquisition system whose function is to inform the monitor, and perhaps third parties, whether the host has or has not violated the terms of a treaty. The national interests of the various participants, host, monitor and third parties, at first appear to be mutually irreconcilable, however the conclusion of this paper will be that it is possible to simultaneously satisfy the interests of all parties. The technical device on which this fourth, and hopefully final, iteration of treaty verification systems is based is the concatenation of two or more two key cryptographic systems. In the resulting system no part of the rneasage need be kept secret from any participant at anytime; no party, nor collusion of fewer than all of the parties can utter an undetectable forgery; no unilateral action on the part of any party can lessen the confidence of the others as to the authenticity of the data and finally third parties can be logically persuaded of the authenticity of messages. Thus, finally after a decade of development a complete technical solution is in hand for the problem of the verification of treaty compliance.
