Heavy-Ion Microbeam Fault Injection into SRAM-Based FPGA Implementations of Cryptographic Circuits

Transistors hit by heavy ions may conduct transiently, thereby introducing transient logic errors. Attackers can exploit these abnormal behaviors and extract sensitive information from the electronic devices. This paper demonstrates an ion irradiation fault injection attack experiment into a cryptographic field-programmable gate-array (FPGA) circuit. The experiment proved that the commercial FPGA chip is vulnerable to low-linear energy transfer carbon irradiation, and the attack can cause the leakage of secret key bits. A statistical model is established to estimate the possibility of an effective fault injection attack on cryptographic integrated circuits. The model incorporates the effects from temporal, spatial, and logical probability of an effective attack on the cryptographic circuits. The rate of successful attack calculated from the model conforms well to the experimental results. This quantitative success rate model can help evaluate security risk for designers as well as for the third-party assessment organizations.