DocumentCode :
592389
Title :
On Stackelberg routing on parallel networks with horizontal queues
Author :
Krichene, Walid ; Reilly, Jenny ; Amin, Saurabh ; Bayen, A.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. Eng. & Comput. Sci., Univ. of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
fYear :
2012
fDate :
10-13 Dec. 2012
Firstpage :
7126
Lastpage :
7132
Abstract :
In order to address inefficiencies of Nash equilibria for congestion networks with horizontal queues, we study the Stackelberg routing game on parallel networks: assuming a coordinator has control over a fraction of the flow, and that the remaining players respond selfishly, what is an optimal Stackelberg strategy of the coordinator, i.e. a strategy that minimizes the cost of the induced equilibrium? We study Stackelberg routing for a new class of latency functions, which models congestion on horizontal queues. We introduce a candidate strategy, the non-compliant first strategy, and prove it to be optimal. Then we apply these results by modeling a transportation network in which a coordinator can choose the routes of a subset of the drivers, while the rest of the drivers choose their routes selfishly.
Keywords :
game theory; telecommunication network routing; Nash equilibria; Stackelberg routing game strategy; congestion networks; horizontal queues; noncompliant first strategy; parallel networks; transportation network; Argon; Manganese; Routing;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Decision and Control (CDC), 2012 IEEE 51st Annual Conference on
Conference_Location :
Maui, HI
ISSN :
0743-1546
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-2065-8
Electronic_ISBN :
0743-1546
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CDC.2012.6426526
Filename :
6426526
Link To Document :
بازگشت