DocumentCode
619506
Title
VeriTrust: Verification for hardware trust
Author
Jie Zhang ; Feng Yuan ; Lingxiao Wei ; Zelong Sun ; Qiang Xu
Author_Institution
Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong, Shatin, China
fYear
2013
fDate
May 29 2013-June 7 2013
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
8
Abstract
Hardware Trojans (HTs) implemented by adversaries serve as backdoors to subvert or augment the normal operation of infected devices, which may lead to functionality changes, sensitive information leakages, or Denial of Service attacks. To tackle such threats, this paper proposes a novel verification technique for hardware trust, namely VeriTrust, which facilitates to detect HTs inserted at design stage. Based on the observation that HTs are usually activated by dedicated trigger inputs that are not sensitized with verification test cases, VeriTrust automatically identifies such potential HT trigger inputs by examining verification corners. The key difference between VeriTrust and existing HT detection techniques is that VeriTrust is insensitive to the implementation style of HTs. Experimental results show that VeriTrust is able to detect all HTs evaluated in this paper (constructed based on various HT design methodologies shown in the literature) at the cost of moderate extra verification time, which is not possible with existing solutions.
Keywords
computer network security; program verification; trusted computing; Denial of Service attacks; HT design methodology; VeriTrust; design stage; hardware Trojan; hardware trust; infected devices; sensitive information leakage; verification test case; Detection algorithms; Hardware; Integrated circuit modeling; Measurement; Payloads; Runtime;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2013 50th ACM/EDAC/IEEE
Conference_Location
Austin, TX
ISSN
0738-100X
Type
conf
Filename
6560654
Link To Document