• DocumentCode
    623829
  • Title

    Self-Interest-Driven incentives for ad dissemination in autonomous mobile social networks

  • Author

    Ting Ning ; Zhipeng Yang ; Hongyi Wu ; Zhu Han

  • fYear
    2013
  • fDate
    14-19 April 2013
  • Firstpage
    2310
  • Lastpage
    2318
  • Abstract
    In this paper, we propose a Self-Interest-Driven (SID) incentive scheme to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes for ad dissemination in autonomous mobile social networks. As a key innovation of SID, we introduce “virtual checks” to eliminate the needs of accurate knowledge about whom and how many credits ad provider should pay. A virtual check is included in each ad packet. When an intended receiver receives the packet for the first time from an intermediate node, the former authorizes the latter a digitally signed check, which serves as a proof of successful ad delivery. Multiple copies of a virtual check can be created and signed by different receivers. When a node that owns a signed check meets the ad provider, it requests the provider to cash the check. Both ad packets and signed checks can be traded among mobile nodes. We propose the effective mechanisms to define virtual rewards for ad packets and virtual checks, and formulate the nodal interaction as a two-player cooperative game, whose solution is obtained by the Nash Bargaining Theorem. Extensive simulations are carried out to compare SID with other existing incentive algorithms under real world mobility traces.
  • Keywords
    advertising data processing; game theory; mobile computing; social networking (online); Nash bargaining theorem; SID incentive scheme; ad delivery; ad dissemination; ad packet; autonomous mobile social networks; digitally signed check; nodal interaction; real world mobility traces; self-interest-driven incentives; two-player cooperative game; virtual check; virtual rewards; Games; Mobile computing; Mobile nodes; Peer-to-peer computing; Receivers; Social network services;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    INFOCOM, 2013 Proceedings IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    Turin
  • ISSN
    0743-166X
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-5944-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567035
  • Filename
    6567035