DocumentCode :
632743
Title :
Coalitional games for the management of anonymous access in online social networks
Author :
Palomar, Esther ; Alcaide, Almudena ; Molina, Emilio ; Yan Zhang
Author_Institution :
Comput. Sci. Dept., Carlos III Univ. of Madrid, Leganes, Spain
fYear :
2013
fDate :
10-12 July 2013
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
10
Abstract :
We propose a novel anonymous access control protocol which is formulated as a series of coalitional games, where the players are the owners of shared private resources (big volumes of data) in online social networks (OSNs). Basically, co-owners cooperate to generate by themselves an attribute-based boolean formula to control access to their shared resource. By means of this boolean formula, co-owners are able to secretly express their privacy preferences over a common shared resource and requesters can anonymously access the secured private resource. In this paper, we formally analyze our protocol´s fairness from a cooperative game theory point of view, and how OSN users, which are mostly cooperative, evaluate their expected gains and costs to adopt such cooperative privacy management scheme in many different settings.
Keywords :
Boolean algebra; authorisation; cryptographic protocols; data privacy; game theory; resource allocation; social networking (online); OSN; anonymous access control protocol; anonymous access management; attribute-based Boolean formula; coalitional games; cooperative game theory; cooperative privacy management; online social networks; privacy preferences; protocol fairness; secured private resource; shared private resources; Access control; Game theory; Games; Privacy; Protocols; Social network services; Shapley value; Social networks; coalitional game; cooperative game theory; privacy-aware access control; system´s fairness;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), 2013 Eleventh Annual International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Tarragona
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/PST.2013.6596030
Filename :
6596030
Link To Document :
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