DocumentCode :
640351
Title :
Quality sensitive price competition in spectrum oligopoly
Author :
Ghosh, A. ; Sarkar, Santonu
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Electr. & Syst. Eng., Univ. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
fYear :
2013
fDate :
7-12 July 2013
Firstpage :
2770
Lastpage :
2774
Abstract :
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly where primary users allow secondary access in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission qualities of the licensed bands fluctuate randomly. Each primary needs to select the price of its channel with the knowledge of its own channel state but not that of its competitors. Secondaries choose among the channels available on sale based on their states and prices. We formulate the price selection as a non-cooperative game and prove that a symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy profile exists uniquely. We explicitly compute this strategy profile and analytically and numerically evaluate its efficiency. Our structural results provide certain key insights about the unique symmetric NE.
Keywords :
game theory; radio spectrum management; channel state; financial remuneration; licensed bands; noncooperative game; price selection; quality sensitive price competition; spectrum oligopoly; symmetric Nash equilibrium; transmission quality; Educational institutions; Games; Information theory; Nash equilibrium; Oligopoly; Pricing; Writing;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2013 IEEE International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Istanbul
ISSN :
2157-8095
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ISIT.2013.6620730
Filename :
6620730
Link To Document :
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