An auction-based mechanism for spectrum leasing in overlay cognitive radio networks

Spectrum leasing in cognitive radio networks has recently started to draw the attention of the researchers. According to this concept, the primary users own specific spectral resources and they decide how to lease them to the secondary users so as to optimize their performance. In this paper, we consider an overlay cognitive radio network where the secondary users are allowed to transmit simultaneously with the primary user in exchange for devoting a part of their power to relay the primary signal. Focusing on the distributed nature of cognitive radio networks, we propose an auction-based mechanism for the leasing process. The secondary users, who represent the bidders, decide the power that are willing to employ for relaying PU´s data whereas the primary user has the role of the auctioneer deciding the duration of the leasing process as well as the leasing time allocated to each secondary user. Furthermore, three different scenarios are studied, depending on the channel state information available to the secondary users. The performance of the proposed mechanism is investigated through the numerical analysis and the advantages of complete knowledge of channel state information are highlighted.