Exploiting Process Variations and Programming Sensitivity of Phase Change Memory for Reconfigurable Physical Unclonable Functions

Physical unclonable function (PUF) leverages the immensely complex and irreproducible nature of physical structures to achieve device authentication and secret information storage. To enhance the security and robustness of conventional PUFs, reconfigurable physical unclonable functions (RPUFs) with dynamically refreshable challenge-response pairs (CRPs) have emerged recently. In this paper, we propose two novel physically reconfigurable PUF (P-RPUF) schemes that exploit the process parameter variability and programming sensitivity of phase change memory (PCM) for CRP reconfiguration and evaluation. The first proposed PCM-based P-RPUF scheme extracts its CRPs from the measurable differences of the PCM cell resistances programmed by randomly varying pulses. An imprecisely controlled regulator is used to protect the privacy of the CRP in case the configuration state of the RPUF is divulged. The second proposed PCM-based RPUF scheme produces the random response by counting the number of programming pulses required to make the cell resistance converge to a predetermined target value. The merging of CRP reconfiguration and evaluation overcomes the inherent vulnerability of P-RPUF devices to malicious prediction attacks by limiting the number of accessible CRPs between two consecutive reconfigurations to only one. Both schemes were experimentally evaluated on 180-nm PCM chips. The obtained results demonstrated their quality for refreshable key generation when appropriate fuzzy extractor algorithms are incorporated.