Title :
How Much Should You Pay for Information?
Author :
Vetsikas, Ioannis A. ; Croitoru, Madalina
Author_Institution :
Nat. Center for Sci. Res. “Demokritos”, Greece
Abstract :
The amount of data available greatly increases every year and information can be quite valuable in the right hands. The existing mechanisms for selling goods, such as VCG, cannot handle sharable goods, such as information. To alleviate this limitation we present our preliminary work on mechanisms for selling goods that can be shared or copied. We present and analyze efficient incentive compatible mechanisms for selling a single sharable good to bidders who are happy to share it.
Keywords :
Internet; data handling; VCG; incentive compatible mechanisms; single sharable good; Communities; Cost accounting; Integrated circuits; Knowledge engineering; Mechanical factors; Optimization; Protocols; auctions; game theory; mechanism design; selling copiable goods;
Conference_Titel :
e-Business Engineering (ICEBE), 2013 IEEE 10th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Coventry
DOI :
10.1109/ICEBE.2013.7
