DocumentCode
655252
Title
How Much Should You Pay for Information?
Author
Vetsikas, Ioannis A. ; Croitoru, Madalina
Author_Institution
Nat. Center for Sci. Res. “Demokritos”, Greece
fYear
2013
fDate
11-13 Sept. 2013
Firstpage
44
Lastpage
49
Abstract
The amount of data available greatly increases every year and information can be quite valuable in the right hands. The existing mechanisms for selling goods, such as VCG, cannot handle sharable goods, such as information. To alleviate this limitation we present our preliminary work on mechanisms for selling goods that can be shared or copied. We present and analyze efficient incentive compatible mechanisms for selling a single sharable good to bidders who are happy to share it.
Keywords
Internet; data handling; VCG; incentive compatible mechanisms; single sharable good; Communities; Cost accounting; Integrated circuits; Knowledge engineering; Mechanical factors; Optimization; Protocols; auctions; game theory; mechanism design; selling copiable goods;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
e-Business Engineering (ICEBE), 2013 IEEE 10th International Conference on
Conference_Location
Coventry
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICEBE.2013.7
Filename
6686240
Link To Document