• DocumentCode
    655252
  • Title

    How Much Should You Pay for Information?

  • Author

    Vetsikas, Ioannis A. ; Croitoru, Madalina

  • Author_Institution
    Nat. Center for Sci. Res. “Demokritos”, Greece
  • fYear
    2013
  • fDate
    11-13 Sept. 2013
  • Firstpage
    44
  • Lastpage
    49
  • Abstract
    The amount of data available greatly increases every year and information can be quite valuable in the right hands. The existing mechanisms for selling goods, such as VCG, cannot handle sharable goods, such as information. To alleviate this limitation we present our preliminary work on mechanisms for selling goods that can be shared or copied. We present and analyze efficient incentive compatible mechanisms for selling a single sharable good to bidders who are happy to share it.
  • Keywords
    Internet; data handling; VCG; incentive compatible mechanisms; single sharable good; Communities; Cost accounting; Integrated circuits; Knowledge engineering; Mechanical factors; Optimization; Protocols; auctions; game theory; mechanism design; selling copiable goods;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    e-Business Engineering (ICEBE), 2013 IEEE 10th International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Coventry
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICEBE.2013.7
  • Filename
    6686240