DocumentCode :
656759
Title :
On phasor measurement unit placement against state and topology attacks
Author :
Jinsub Kim ; Lang Tong
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY, USA
fYear :
2013
fDate :
21-24 Oct. 2013
Firstpage :
396
Lastpage :
401
Abstract :
Cyber attacks on the SCADA system can mislead the control center to produce incorrect state and topology estimate. If undetected, state and topology attacks can have detrimental impacts on the real-time operation of a power system. The problem of placing secure phasor measurement units (PMUs) to detect such attacks is considered. It is shown that any state or topology attack is detectable if and only if buses with secure PMUs form a vertex cover of the system topology. This condition leads to the countermeasures constructed by available graph algorithms. The examples with IEEE 14-bus, 118-bus, and 300-bus systems demonstrate applications of the countermeasures.
Keywords :
IEEE standards; SCADA systems; graph theory; phasor measurement; power engineering computing; power system security; power system state estimation; telecommunication network topology; IEEE 118-bus system; IEEE 14-bus system; IEEE 300-bus system; PMU placement; SCADA system; control center; cyber attack; graph algorithm; incorrect state estimation; phasor measurement unit placement; power system; topology attack; Approximation algorithms; Network topology; Phasor measurement units; State estimation; Topology; Transmission line measurements; Vectors; Power system cyber security; false data injection; phasor measurement units; state estimation; topology attack;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2013 IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Vancouver, BC
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/SmartGridComm.2013.6687990
Filename :
6687990
Link To Document :
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