• DocumentCode
    665672
  • Title

    Analysis of data-leak hardware Trojans in AES cryptographic circuits

  • Author

    Reece, T. ; Robinson, William H.

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Electr. Eng. & Comput. Sci., Vanderbilt Univ., Nashville, TN, USA
  • fYear
    2013
  • fDate
    12-14 Nov. 2013
  • Firstpage
    467
  • Lastpage
    472
  • Abstract
    This study examines the impact of 18 hardware Trojans inserted into an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) cryptographic circuit in terms of area, leakage power, and dynamic power. These Trojans were supplied from the Trust-HUB repository. This study was performed by first synthesizing the designs to 90-nm and 45-nm standard cell libraries. Then, those designs were compared to the Trojan-free circuit synthesized to the corresponding technology. All of these Trojans had very small footprints on the design in terms of area and power. Furthermore, despite all of the Trojans leaking the key in some way, the measured footprints fell over a wide range.
  • Keywords
    cryptography; invasive software; AES cryptographic circuits; Trojan-free circuit; Trust-HUB repository; advanced encryption standard; area; data-leak hardware Trojans; dynamic power; leakage power; standard cell libraries; Cryptography; Fabrication; Hardware; Libraries; Power measurement; Standards; Trojan horses;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 2013 IEEE International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Waltham, MA
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4799-3963-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/THS.2013.6699049
  • Filename
    6699049