Title :
Advanced Analysis of Faults Injected Through Conducted Intentional Electromagnetic Interferences
Author :
Sauvage, L. ; Danger, Jean-Luc ; Guilley, Sylvain ; Homma, Noriyasu ; Hayashi, Yu-ichi
Author_Institution :
Inst. MinesTelecom, Telecom ParisTech, Paris, France
Abstract :
Experimental setups used in electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) tests can be used as platforms for fault injections. Injecting faults into equipment is a means for a malevolent attacker to extract secret information. In this paper, we first present an advanced setup, i.e., a setup with characteristics beyond the main international EMC standards. It performs more accurate measurements of the disturbance power, reducing the measurement error by 20.33 dB. Second, we propose an advanced analysis methodology allowing an attacker or a countermeasure designer to identify the disturbance frequency leading to the most powerful attack. As an illustration, the method is applied on an ASIC implementation of DES, providing a thorough characterization and classification of the generated faults. In this case, the most powerful attacks are performed when the disturbance has a frequency below 1 MHz. The threat has thus to be considered really serious, as generating such disturbance does not require a high budget.
Keywords :
application specific integrated circuits; cryptography; data privacy; electromagnetic interference; fault diagnosis; ASIC implementation; DES; EMC tests; advanced analysis methodology; advanced faults analysis; countermeasure designer; disturbance frequency; disturbance power measurements; electromagnetic compatibility; fault injection; faults injection; frequency disturbance; generated fault characterization; generated fault classification; injected through conducted intentional electromagnetic interferences; international EMC standards; malevolent attacker; measurement error; secret information; Electromagnetics; Encryption; Generators; Radio frequency; Standards; Three-dimensional displays; Conducted disturbances; electromagnetic compatibility; fault injection attack; information leakage; intentional electromagnetic interferences;
Journal_Title :
Electromagnetic Compatibility, IEEE Transactions on
DOI :
10.1109/TEMC.2013.2254715