DocumentCode :
668424
Title :
Evolutionary game analysis and computer simulation of iron ore price negotiation
Author :
Yun Zhang ; Qing He
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ., Wuhan Univ. of Technol., Wuhan, China
Volume :
1
fYear :
2013
fDate :
23-24 Nov. 2013
Firstpage :
409
Lastpage :
412
Abstract :
The paper established an evolutionary game to analyze the international iron ore price negotiations which the Chinese steel enterprises participated under the rationality assumptions of negotiation parties. The results showed that the interest improved in the price negotiations between the steel enterprises and the iron ore enterprises is related to the additional income from both the steel enterprises and iron ore enterprises compromise, and the betrayal revenue for the party who choose the non-compromise strategy while the other party select the compromise strategy. Next, we simulate the evolutionary game using the matlab7.10 and find that the larger the distribution coefficient of additional income of the steel enterprise or the iron ore enterprises is, the faster the enterprise chooses the compromise strategy. Finally, we suggest some reasonable iron ore negotiation strategies to provide Chinese steel enterprises with a theoretical basis.
Keywords :
digital simulation; evolutionary computation; game theory; international trade; mathematics computing; minerals; pricing; steel industry; Chinese steel enterprises; Matlab 7.10; additional income distribution coefficient; computer simulation; evolutionary game analysis; international iron ore price negotiations; iron ore enterprises; negotiation parties; noncompromise strategy; Analytical models; Equations; Games; Iron; Mathematical model; Pricing; Steel; Chinese steel enterprises; computer simulation; evolutionary game; iron ore price negotiation;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII), 2013 6th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Xi´an
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4799-3985-5
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICIII.2013.6702960
Filename :
6702960
Link To Document :
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