DocumentCode :
672423
Title :
The flow fingerprinting game
Author :
Elices, Juan A. ; Perez-Gonzalez, F.
Author_Institution :
Electr. & Comput. Eng., Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA
fYear :
2013
fDate :
18-21 Nov. 2013
Firstpage :
97
Lastpage :
102
Abstract :
Linking two network flows that have the same source is essential in intrusion detection or in tracing anonymous connections. To improve the performance of this process, the flow can be modified (fingerprinted) to make it more distinguishable. However, an adversary located in the middle can modify the flow to impair the correlation by delaying the packets or introducing dummy traffic. We introduce a game-theoretic framework for this problem, that is used to derive the Nash Equilibrium. As obtaining the optimal adversary delays distribution is intractable, some approximations are done. We study the concrete example where these delays follow a truncated Gaussian distribution. We also compare the optimal strategies with other fingerprinting schemes. The results are useful for understanding the limits of flow correlation based on packet timings under an active attacker.
Keywords :
Gaussian distribution; fingerprint identification; game theory; image watermarking; security of data; telecommunication traffic; Nash equilibrium; anonymous connections; dummy traffic; fingerprinting schemes; flow correlation; flow fingerprinting game; game-theoretic framework; intrusion detection; network flows; optimal adversary delays distribution; optimal strategy; packet timings; truncated Gaussian distribution; Artificial intelligence; Delays; Fingerprint recognition; Fingers; Games;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Information Forensics and Security (WIFS), 2013 IEEE International Workshop on
Conference_Location :
Guangzhou
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/WIFS.2013.6707801
Filename :
6707801
Link To Document :
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