False-data injection attack to control real-time price in electricity market

The normal operation of electricity market requires accurate state estimation of the power grids. However, recent research shows that carefully synthesized false-data injection attacks can easily introduce errors to state estimates without being detected by the current security systems. In this paper, we analyze and formulate an effective false-data injection attack to control real-time electricity price at any tagged bus. It is observed that an adversary capable of false-data injection attack can induce false real-time electricity price by fabricating biased transmission congestion pattern. From the strategic level, we propose a simple algorithm that finds the effective congestion pattern with minor distortion to the normal system operation. For practical implementation, load redistribution attack, a special false-data injection attack which produces biased load estimates, is used to achieve the derived congestion pattern. We also propose a cost-aware neighborhood load redistribution attack, which only compromises limited measurements around the tagged bus. From theory to practice, our results here reveal the potential cyber vulnerabilities of current electricity market and would help to build more secure smart power grid in the future.