DocumentCode :
692425
Title :
Computation of Mixed Strategy Non-dominated Nash Equilibria in Game Theory
Author :
Soares, Cesar A. O. ; Batista, Lucas S. ; Campelo, Felipe ; Guimaraes, Frederico
Author_Institution :
Grad. Program in Electr. Eng., Univ. Fed. de Minas Gerais Belo Horizonte, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
fYear :
2013
fDate :
8-11 Sept. 2013
Firstpage :
242
Lastpage :
247
Abstract :
Finding Nash equilibria has been one of the early objectives of research in game theory, and still represents a challenge to this day. We introduce a multiobjective formulation for computing Pareto-optimal sets of mixed Nash equilibria in normal form games. Computing these sets can be notably useful in decision making, because it focuses the analysis on solutions with greater outcome and hence more stable and desirable ones. While the formulation is suitable for any multiobjective optimization algorithm, we employ a method known as the cone-epsilon MOEA, due to its good convergence and diversity characteristics when solving multiobjective optimization problems. The adequacy of the proposed formulation is tested on most normal form games provided by the GAMBIT software test suite. The results show that the cone-epsilon MOEA working on the proposed formulation correctly finds the Pareto-optimal Nash equilibra in most games.
Keywords :
Pareto optimisation; game theory; GAMBIT software test suite; Pareto-optimal sets; cone-epsilon MOEA; diversity characteristic; game theory; multiobjective formulation; multiobjective optimization algorithm; nondominated Nash equilibria; Game theory; Games; Optimization; Silicon; Sociology; Statistics; Vectors; Nash; Pareto; evolutionary algorithm; multiobjective;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Computational Intelligence and 11th Brazilian Congress on Computational Intelligence (BRICS-CCI & CBIC), 2013 BRICS Congress on
Conference_Location :
Ipojuca
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/BRICS-CCI-CBIC.2013.47
Filename :
6855856
Link To Document :
بازگشت