DocumentCode
710619
Title
A call to action: Securing IEEE 1687 and the need for an IEEE test Security Standard
Author
Dworak, Jennifer ; Crouch, Al
Author_Institution
Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., Southern Methodist Univ., Dallas, TX, USA
fYear
2015
fDate
27-29 April 2015
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
Today´s chips often contain a wealth of embedded instruments, including sensors, hardware monitors, built-in self-test (BIST) engines, etc. They may process sensitive data that requires encryption or obfuscation and may contain encryption keys and ChipIDs. Unfortunately, unauthorized access to internal registers or instruments through test and debug circuitry can turn design for testability (DFT) logic into a backdoor for data theft, reverse engineering, counterfeiting, and denial-of-service attacks. A compromised chip also poses a security threat to any board or system that includes that chip, and boards have their own security issues. We will provide an overview of some chip and board security concerns as they relate to DFT hardware and will briefly review several ways in which the new IEEE 1687 standard can be made more secure. We will then discuss the need for an IEEE Security Standard that can provide solutions and metrics for providing appropriate security matched to the needs of a real world environment.
Keywords
built-in self test; cryptography; design for testability; reverse engineering; BIST; ChipID; DFT hardware; DFT logic; IEEE 1687; IEEE test security standard; built-in self-test; data theft; denial-of-service attacks; design for testability; embedded instruments; encryption keys; hardware monitors; internal registers; reverse engineering; Encryption; Instruments; Microprogramming; Ports (Computers); Registers; Standards; BIST; DFT; IEEE Standard; IJTAG; JTAG; LSIB; P1687; lock; scan; security; trap;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
VLSI Test Symposium (VTS), 2015 IEEE 33rd
Conference_Location
Napa, CA
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/VTS.2015.7116256
Filename
7116256
Link To Document