Impact of decreasing number of bidders on power bidding in deregulated environment

Optimum power bidding in deregulation is quite important not only for business profitability but also from energy sustainability. Particularly this becomes interesting when any one bidder is withdrawing participation amongst several contesting bidders. In this work effect of withdrawal of one bidder among three participating bidders are analyzed. Here each bidder has one thermal generating unit & they are offering different bidding prices for gaining maximum profit. Different category of bidding situations are considered when three bidders are withdrawing power bidding one by one. Different bidding profile combinations along with some technical constraints like power balance constraints, power generation limit & fuel cost constraints are considered here. Economic power scheduling has been done using Newton-Raphson method for standard IEEE 9 bus test system. Impact of decreasing number of bidder on rest of the participating bidder´s profits, market price have been analysed in each case. For the power bidding problem, theory of dominance approach of Game theory has been applied & searching of the Nash equilibrium has been accomplished. It is observed that the participating bidders are gaining more profit except in “sub-marginal bidding” when one particular bidder has made it´s exit. But power selling price has increased in all cases.