Title :
GDS-II Trojan detection using multiple supply pad VDD and GND IDDQs in ASIC functional units
Author :
Wilcox, I. ; Saqib, F. ; Plusquellic, J.
Author_Institution :
Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA
Abstract :
We propose a parametric, side-channel-based method designed to detect malicious changes that have been made to the chip layout, i.e., the GDS-II representation, by an adversary. We measure steady-state leakage currents (IDDQ) from multiple, topologically distributed power ports on the chip and propose a chip-averaging method for eliminating within-die variations and improving the Hardware Trojan (HT) signal-to-process-noise detection sensitivity of our statistical-based detection methods. The technique is validated for the first time by measuring IDDQ from an ASIC with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Floating Point Unit (FPU) macros, 16 VDD and GND ports and a set of special HT emulation circuits. IDDQ data is measured from multiple copies of the IBM, 90 nm ASIC.
Keywords :
application specific integrated circuits; cryptography; floating point arithmetic; integrated circuit layout; invasive software; AES; ASIC functional units; FPU; GDS-II Trojan detection; GDS-II representation; GND; advanced encryption standard; chip layout; floating point unit; multiple supply pad; side-channel-based method; steady-state leakage currents; Hardware; Security;
Conference_Titel :
Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2015 IEEE International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Washington, DC
DOI :
10.1109/HST.2015.7140253