DocumentCode :
717744
Title :
Location-Based Pseudonyms for Identity Reinforcement in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Author :
Tunaru, I. ; Denis, B. ; Uguen, B.
Author_Institution :
CEA-Leti Minatec, Grenoble, France
fYear :
2015
fDate :
11-14 May 2015
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
5
Abstract :
In this paper we introduce methods that strengthen the identity of end-devices in order to prevent impersonation attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. Pseudonyms are locally generated from Received Signal Strength Indicators (RSSI) for narrow band IEEE 802.15.4 standard or Round Trip - Time of Flight (RT-ToF) measurements (optionally, along with relative clock drift estimates) for Impulse Radio - Ultra Wideband (IR-UWB) technology. These radiolocation metrics are converted into range measurements, quantized and then fed into hash functions to produce pseudonyms. For the two benchmarked radio technologies, practical trade- offs are illustrated depending on the input measurement accuracy under different channel assumptions. The evaluated solution enables to securely guess the pseudonyms of trusted neighbors with no information leakage. It also achieves advantageous low probability of successful attacks based on brute-force or statistics-aided strategies or compared to other impersonation detection strategies (e.g. RSSI history monitoring).
Keywords :
ad hoc networks; telecommunication security; ultra wideband communication; end device identity; identity reinforcement; impersonation attacks; impulse radio ultra wideband technology; location based pseudonyms; narrow band IEEE 802.15.4 standard; received signal strength indicators; relative clock drift estimation; round trip time of flight measurements; wireless ad hoc networks; Authentication; Clocks; Distance measurement; Niobium; Peer-to-peer computing; Quantization (signal);
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Spring), 2015 IEEE 81st
Conference_Location :
Glasgow
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/VTCSpring.2015.7145918
Filename :
7145918
Link To Document :
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