Game theoretic approach to global climate control

Controlling global warming through collectively cooperating is of importance for all the people. It is a non-optional threshold public goods game. Population benefits from meeting the target; while rational individuals try to free ride. This leads to the failure of reaching the target, resulting in global warming. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic control approach, based on the feedback control theory. The method applies to complex systems where control variables are influenced by multiple restrictions, which are very likely intelligent agents and “smart” enough to maximize their own fitness while increase the difficulty of control. Specifically, the evolutionary game process can be viewed as the controller of the climate system, whose exact mathematical model is usually hard to be built. The optimum strategy combination of individuals, which directs the regulation of target variables, can be spontaneously evolved. We applied this approach to the climate control issue in the context of global warming. We find that on the one hand the control target of temperature stabilization can be realized in the long run. On the other hand, the cooperation can be promoted and be maintained at a higher level, compared with classical public goods games with no such feedback. Furthermore, we study parameter settings, and mechanisms of improving the control performance.