DocumentCode
8024
Title
On dynamics and Nash equilibriums of networked games
Author
Daizhan Cheng ; Tingting Xu ; Fenghua He ; Hongsheng Qi
Author_Institution
Inst. of Syst. Sci., Beijing, China
Volume
1
Issue
1
fYear
2014
fDate
Jan. 2014
Firstpage
10
Lastpage
18
Abstract
Networked noncooperative games are investigated, where each player (or agent) plays with all other players in its neighborhood. Assume the evolution is based on the fact that each player uses its neighbors´ current information to decide its next strategy. By using sub-neighborhood, the dynamics of the evolution is obtained. Then a method for calculating Nash equilibriums from mixed strategies of multi-players is proposed. The relationship between local Nash equilibriums based on individual neighborhoods and global Nash equilibriums of overall network is revealed. Then a technique is proposed to construct Nash equilibriums of an evolutionary game from its one step static Nash equilibriums. The basic tool of this approach is the semi-tensor product of matrices, which converts strategies into logical matrices and payoffs into pseudo-Boolean functions, then networked evolutionary games become discrete time dynamic systems.
Keywords
Boolean functions; discrete time systems; evolutionary computation; game theory; matrix algebra; network theory (graphs); discrete time dynamic systems; evolution dynamics; evolutionary game; matrix semitensor product; multiplayer mixed strategies; networked evolutionary games; networked noncooperative games; pseudoBoolean functions; static Nash equilibrium; Equations; Evolution (biology); Games; Mathematical model; Nash equilibrium; Probabilistic logic; Nash equilibrium; Networked non-cooperative game; fundamental evolutionary equation; local information; sub-neighborhood;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Automatica Sinica, IEEE/CAA Journal of
Publisher
ieee
ISSN
2329-9266
Type
jour
DOI
10.1109/JAS.2014.7004614
Filename
7004614
Link To Document