Title :
Market signaling: An example of a two-person decision problem with dynamic information structure
Author :
Ho, Yu-chi ; Kastner, Marcia P.
Author_Institution :
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
fDate :
4/1/1978 12:00:00 AM
Abstract :
An economic model of the job market is formulated as a two-person decision problem with dynamic information structure. The role of the decentralized information is investigated in terms of finding equilibrium solutions and properties of these solutions, such as stability, multiple solutions, and threshold effects of signaling cost and noise.
Keywords :
Business economics; Decentralized control; Differential games; Optimal stochastic control; Stochastic optimal control; Consumer electronics; Costs; Displays; Educational programs; Game theory; Helium; Large-scale systems; Physics education; Remuneration; Sliding mode control;
Journal_Title :
Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on
DOI :
10.1109/TAC.1978.1101723
