DocumentCode
845567
Title
Linear-quadratic reversed Stackelberg differential games with incentives
Author
Pachter, M.
Author_Institution
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Pretoria, South Africa
Volume
29
Issue
7
fYear
1984
fDate
7/1/1984 12:00:00 AM
Firstpage
644
Lastpage
647
Abstract
In this technical note the linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with reversed information structure is considered. The leader is confined to stroboscopic (or snap-decision) strategies and necessary and sufficient conditions are then given for the leader to be able to impose, with the help of side payments, the (optimal) team solution.
Keywords
Game theory, linear systems; Control systems; Cost function; Detectors; Dynamic programming; Equations; Feedback; Sufficient conditions;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher
ieee
ISSN
0018-9286
Type
jour
DOI
10.1109/TAC.1984.1103604
Filename
1103604
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