Securing Cooperative Ad-Hoc Networks Under Noise and Imperfect Monitoring: Strategies and Game Theoretic Analysis

In cooperative ad-hoc networks, nodes belong to the same authority and pursue the common goals, and will usually unconditionally help each other. Consequently, without necessary countermeasures, such networks are extremely vulnerable to insider attacks, especially under noise and imperfect monitoring. In this paper, we present a game theoretic analysis of securing cooperative ad-hoc networks against insider attacks in the presence of noise and imperfect monitoring. By focusing on the most basic networking function, namely routing and packet forwarding, we model the interactions between good nodes and insider attackers as secure routing and packet forwarding games. The worst case scenarios are studied where initially good nodes do not know who the attackers are while insider attackers know who are good. The optimal defense strategies have been devised in the sense that no other strategies can further increase the good nodes´ payoff under attacks. Meanwhile, the optimal attacking strategies and the maximum possible damage that can be caused by attackers have been discussed. Extensive simulation studies have also been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies