نقد برداشت گاير از رد انگاره نگري كانت

Critique of Guyer’s Understanding on Kant’s Idealism

اين نوشته تلاشي است براي نشان دادن اين نكته كه نگاه گاير در كتاب رد انگاره نگري كانت با طرح اينكه مكان به شيء في نفسه قابل اطلاق است تا چه اندازه بر فهمي غيركانتي و غير منطبق با نگاه فلسفي كانتي بنا شده و چگونه با همين برداشتِ غيركانتي انگاره نگري كانتي را واقعگرايانه[1] فهميده، درحالي كه همه ويژگي بروز انديشه فلسفي كانت به اينست كه شيء في نفسه يا وجود بيرون از سوژه هست ولي هيچ شناخت پديدارانه اي از آن ممكن نيست و از همين رو مكان بدان قابل اطلاق نيست. تلاش خواهد شد با رجوع به متن كانت روح انديشه وي آشكار و از آن طريق فهم تجربه نگرانه[2] گاير را با ترديدي فلسفي مواجه كرد. براي دفع مطول شدن، مقاله پيش رو تنها به فهم گاير از ويراست دوم نقد نخست كانت نظر داشته، به بخش ديگري از كتاب وي كه به آثار متاخر كانت Nachlass استناد كرده نظر نداشته، زيرا روح استدلال وي در آن بخش نيز بر همان فهم تحليل شده در اين مقاله استوار است.

In this paper I try to refute Guyer’s reading of Kant’s refutation of idealism in a way in which I defend Kant’s idealism which has been denied by Guyer. By the notion of idealism according to Kant’s philosophy I mean we are not allowed to use space referring to thing in itself, as opposed to Guyer’s claim. In other words according to Kant objects of experience are objectively constructed by subject based upon lawful connection between them, as he expresses in the first analogy of experience, overlooking what they are really in themselves as mind-independent reality. I shall show Kant’s refutation of idealism does not involve any knowledge of thing in itself as opposed to Guyer’s reading; rather, Kant uses outer thing as an object of experience, that is, outer things are experience-sensations under application of categories. Some scholars such as Allison (2004) have defended Kant’s idealism. Dina Emundts (2010) shows, as opposed to Guyer’s claim, Kant has located refutation of idealism in the right place, namely after analogies of experience in edition B. She also shows refutation of idealism can attain its goal and it does not thus fail; that is, it can rebut problematic idealism. I endeavor to concentrate on the issue which indicates Kant uses outer thing in refutation of idealism in edition B as object of experience not as thing in itself. Meanwhile, I rebut Guyer’s argument and adduce my own reasons point-by-point in order to defend Kant’s idealism.