نسبت انديشۀ ماشين جانوري دكارت با رفتارهاي زيست محيطي جديد

The Relation between Descartes "bête machine" theory and modern Environmental Behaviors

اين مقاله به تأثير انديشۀ دكارت در باب حيوانات و نظريۀ موسوم به ماشين جانوري او بر رفتارهاي زيست محيطي دورۀ مدرن مي‌پردازد. ابتدا هشت فقرۀ قابل انتساب به انديشۀ دكارت در باب حيوانات (ماشين بودن، رفتار خودكار، انديشه، زبان، خودآگاهي، آگاهي، احساس و حيات) ارزيابي شده‌اند. سپس سه آموزۀ كليدي وحدت و يكپارچگي، بي‌مرتبه‌گي تكويني و همين‌طور كنشگري غيرنفساني به‌عنوان آموزه‌هاي اساسي قابل استخراج از انديشۀ دكارت در باب حيوانات، طبيعت و حتي بدن انساني پيشنهاد شده‌اند. در اينجا نشان داده‌ايم كه اين سه آموزه، اعم از آنكه دكارتي خوانده شوند يا نه، حضور و تأثير عميقي در رفتارهاي بعضاً مخرب انسان دورۀ مدرن با طبيعت بر جاي گذاشته‌اند و مهم‌تر از آن، تغيير نگرش و توجه او در باب برخي مفاهيم مانند «طبيعت» را رقم زده‌اند و آن را به مفاهيم و تعاريف انسان‌مدار و خودخواهانه‌تري فروكاسته‌اند. در انتها به اين نكته پرداخته‌ايم كه يكي از دلايل اين رخداد، اجمال هستي‌شناختي‌اي است كه محرك آن نه فقط سوداي احكام يقيني در باب عالم بلكه دانش تجربي محدود دكارتي است و گذار از آن اجمال به تفصيل هستي‌شناختي، شرط برون رفت از اين رويكرد و رفتار دكارتي با حيوانات و طبيعت است.

This paper is a study and the philosophical critique of the concept of "bête machine" theory with the human environmental behaviors in Modern ages, and our question is what precisely does Cartesian mean the modern and contemporary man's behaviors with animals and the environment?
We have first studied and evaluated precisely Cartesian propositions about animals and examined the ability of the theory to cover the whole material nature, including the human body. The doctrine of unity and integrity, the doctrine of Genesis Classlessness and the doctrine of non-thinking activism are three basic doctrines that can be deduced from Descartes' thought. Then we have discussed that the way of defining the environment in the modern ages and some humanistic behaviors in modern and pseudo-modern societies with nature and animals is fully compatible with these three Cartesian doctrines and does not consider any natural and inherent right for inhuman vital organisms.
Finally, we have argued that Descartes' ability to extract the moral and legal system governing human behavior with animals and nature can be interpreted in two ways: 1. This perspective is sufficient to extract these Systems; 2. This view is certain, but to extract these systems is inadequate, and as a result, we need to advance and develop our knowledge in metaphysics or in science in order to establish a moral and legal system for dealing with animals and nature. Then, with the advent of the second interpretation, we believe that the mere consistency of these Descartes' principles with this kind of modern moral and legal norms is not a good reason to call the behavior of modern humans to animals and nature as Cartesian. In Descartes's view, progress in science is a necessary condition for the establishment of morality; new sciences and sciences such as animal and natural physiology can be considered as such.