ضعف اراده و آكراسيا دو پديده متمايزند ؟

Are the Weakness of Will and Akrasia Two Distinct Phenomena

اكراسيا در ادبيات سنتي فلسفي بدين معناست كه فرد با بهترين حكم خود مخالفت كند. برخي از فلاسفه اخيرا اين پديده را با ضعف اراده يكي دانسته اند، اما هولتن اين دو پديده را متمايز مي داند و استدلال مي كند كه ضعف اراده به معناي نقض قصدهاي جدي است. اين مقاله نشان مي دهد اين دو پديده بر خلاف ادعاي هولتن، متمايز نيستند، بلكه در اكراسيا و ضعف اراده ،علت ترك فعل با دو رويكرد تبيين مي شود؛ اولي ناظر به فاعل است و دومي ناظر به فعل. بر اساس اين مقاله، تفسير هولتن به رويكرد دوم اشاره دارد، در حالي كه تفسير ارسطو با هر دو سازگار است. اما اگر مؤلفه هاي نظريه هولتن به درستي تحليل شوند مي توانند با عناصر نظريه ارسطو سازگار باشند.

According to traditional philosophical literature, Akrasia is defined as acting against one’s best judgment. Philosophers have considered Akrasia as synonymous with the weakness of will. However, Holton considers these two phenomena to be distinct and argues that weakness of will is better understood as over-readily giving up on one's resolutions. This study seeks to show that these two phenomena – unlike Holton's claim – are not distinct, but the accounts of Akrasia and weakness of will take two approaches to explain the reasons behind quitting actions: (1) in terms of its relationship to the agent; and (2) in terms of its relationship to the action. The researcher attempts to show that Holton's interpretation of the weakness of will refers to the second perspective whereas Aristotle approaches it from two perspectives. However, on duly analyzing the elements put forward by Holton, we can see them to be consistent with those of Aristotle