در قالب بازي انحصار دوجانبه و چگونگي تقسيم منافع حاصل از تجارت نفت در بين آنها ؟CD بررسي رفتار دو سازمان اوپك و

An Investigation of OPEC & OECD Behavior in a Bilateral Monopoly Game and Oil Trade Benefits Sharing

In the present paper, the behavior of two organizations namely OPEC and OECD are analyzed as major and active players in the global oil market within the framework of a Finitely Repeated Bilateral Monopoly Game. This analysis shows that on the strength of Schelling point solution, in this game as a result of applying consistent and long term strategies by both players, OPEC is present as the weak bargainer compared to OECD membersʹ countries. In this framework, OPEC oil strategy is influenced by economic, political and security considerations in which savers group have considerable rote in decision making and decide oil strategy of this organization. On the other hand, OECD oil strategy takes form in accordance with three motivations of economic, safety (energy safety) and in some points environmental. The interaction between the interests of OPEC and OECD leads to the establishment of the equilibrium price in the oil market. This pricing system generates the greatest benefit for the OECD membersʹ countries through tariffs and taxes. Time series analysis and study of long term relations among the variables confirm the above theory.