برهان حفره، جوهرگرايي خمينه اي و واقع گرايي وجودي

The Hole Argument, Manifold Substantivalism, and Ontic Structural Realism

برهان حفره، بعد از مقاله ارمن و نورتن(1987) به يكي از مباحث اصلي در فلسفه فضازمان تبديل شده است كه بر اساس آن نوع خاصي از جوهر‌‌گرايي (جوهرگرايي خمينه‌اي) قابل دفاع نخواهد بود؛ زيرا، به ناموجبيت راديكال منجر مي‌شود. در اين مقاله، مي‌كوشيم‌‌‌ نشان دهيم اولا، نامگذاري جوهرگرايي خمينه‌‌‌اي مناسب نيست؛ چون، همان‌طور كه برخي از فلاسفه گفته‌‌‌‌اند، نقاط خمينه را نمي‌توان واجد اين هماني مستقل دانست. ثانيا، مي‌توان با تعهد واقع‌گرايي ساختاري وجودي تلقي مناسبي از جوهرگرايي خمينه‌‌‌اي ارائه كرد كه بر اساس برهان حفره به ناموجبيت راديكال منجر نمي‌شود؛ در نتيجه، برهان حفره در مورد آن كارگر نمي‌افتد.

The hole argument has become one of the main issues in the philosophy of space-time after the article by Earman and Norton (1987), according to which a certain version of substantivalism (manifold substantivalism) cannot be defended because it brings about to a radical indeterminism. In this article, we try to show that, first, the naming of manifold substantivalism is not appropriate since as some philosophers have said, manifold points cannot be considered to have an independent identity. Second, with a commitment to ontic structural realism, it is possible to offer a proper understanding of manifold substantivalism, which according to the hole argument, does not lead to the radical indeterminism. As a result, the hole argument does not arise, simply. Thus, the last point is that the fact that structural realism is able to solve the problem of the hole argument can itself be seen as considerable evidence in favor of this philosophical position, and thus, the degree of its confirmation goes up.