پديد آورندگان :
نجفي راد، ناهيد دانشگاه آزاد اسلامي واحد تهران غرب - گروه حسابداري، تهران، ايران , احديان پورپروين، دنيا دانشگاه آزاد اسلامي واحد تهران غرب - گروه حسابداري، تهران، ايران , لشكري زاده، مريم دانشگاه آزاد اسلامي واحد تهران غرب - گروه حسابداري، تهران، ايران
چكيده فارسي :
هدف: اين پژوهش بررسي تأثير عملكرد صندوقهاي سرمايهگذاري بر مديريت سود پويا در مرحله عرضه اوليه در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران پرداخته است.
روش: در اين راستا نمونهاي شامل 100 صندوق سرمايهگذاري طي سال هاي 87 تا 98 به روش تحليل-همبستگي مورد بررسي قرار گرفته است. جهت اندازهگيري مديريت سود پويا از مدل گلدسون (2019) و جهت اندازهگيري عملكرد صندوقها از معيارهاي مدرن (شارپ، ترينر، جنسن، ترينر تعديل شده، جنسن تعديل شده) و فرامدرن (سورتينو، پتانسيل مطلوب، M2، نسبت ارزيابي) استفاده شده است.
يافتهها: نتايج حاصل از پژوهش بيانگر اين امر است كه عملكرد مطلوب صندوقهاي سرمايهگذاري تأثير منفي و معناداري بر مديريت سود پويا در عرضه اوليه و پس از آن ميگذارد و عملكرد ضعيف صندوقهاي سرمايهگذاري در مرحله عرضه اوليه تأثير معناداري بر مديريت سود ندارد ولي در دوره پس از عرضه اوليه تأثيري مثبت ومعنادار دارد.
نتيجه گيري: مديران شركتهاي با عملكرد مطلوب بر مبناي فرضيه هزينه سياسي تمايل به مديريت سود كاهشي در مرحله عرضه اوليه و مديران شركتهاي با عملكرد ضعيف بر مبناي فرضيه علامتدهي در بازار سرمايه تمايل به مديريت سود افزايشي در مرحله پس از عرضه اوليه دارند.
چكيده لاتين :
Objective: Earnings management can be motivated by capital market, political, contractual, tax,
agency. In the capital market incentives that are considered in this study, in the IPOs, because the
possibility of access to information for investors is very limited and the risk of information
asymmetry for investors and determine the intrinsic value of relevant stocks is high. Therefore,
Managers are probably motivated to earning management in the last period before the offering of
shares using optional.
According to the political hypothesis, companies with good performance usually try to manage
declining earnings but companies with poor performance, according to the signaling hypothesis
tend to manage incremental earnings in IPOs after earning management because cash profits in
these companies are low, as cash flows may not be enough to hide the effect of the returned
accruals. Therefore, in this study, the effect of mutual fund performance of dynamic earnings
management at IPOs and after has been studied.
According to the theoretical foundations and research background, two hypotheses have been
proposed and evaluated.
Hypothesis 1: Mutual fund performance has a significant effect on dynamic earnings
management in IPOs.
Sub-hypotheses:
1. Good performance of mutual funds during the IPOs has a significant effect on dynamic
earnings management.
2. Poor performance of mutual funds during the IPOs has a significant effect on dynamic
earnings management.
Hypothesis 2: Mutual fund performance has a significant effect on dynamic earnings
management in the period after the IPOs.
Sub-hypotheses:
1. Good performance of mutual funds in the post-IPOs period has a significant effect on
dynamic earnings management.2. Poor performance of mutual funds in the post-IPOs period has a significant effect on
dynamic earnings management.
Methods: The statistical population of this study includes all Mutual funds listed on the Tehran
Stock Exchange and the statistical sample includes 100 Mutual funds during the years 2009 to
2020, which have been selected by systematic elimination method. In this study, the model of
Gledson (2019) was used to estimate the Dynamics of Earnings Management, Modern criteria
(Sharp, Trainer, Jensen, Modified Trainer, Modified Jensen) and meta-modern (Sortino, Optimal
Potential, M2, Evaluation Ratio) was used to estimate the Mutual Fund Performance. Also, to test
the research hypotheses, combined data and multivariate regression using the panel with the fixed
effects method based on generalized least squares method have been employed.
Results: The results show that the good performance of Mutual funds has a negative effect on
dynamic earnings management in the IPOs and after, and the poor performance of mutual funds
in the IPOs has no significant effect on earnings management, but It has a positive effect in the
after the IPOs.
Conclusion: Based on the results obtained, good performance mutual funds use earning
management decreasing methods to determine lower intrinsic values in the market, which is
consistent with the political cost hypothesis.
On the other hand, mutual funds with poor performance during the IPOs is consistent with the
motivation of signaling in the capital market. Under capital market pricing rules, the minimum
price is proposed and offered because of future ambiguities about the intrinsic value of the stock
offered in the IPOs. However, after the IPOs to achieve in order to compensate for their poor
performance and maintain a position in the capital market, they are required to increase earning
management, and if they cannot improve their poor performance and sufficient cash flows to
Concealment of the effect of accruals returned to the fund. The use of incremental earnings
management in subsequent periods of activity will have an adverse effect on the results of their
performance. Given that earnings management can affect future cash flows and the relationship
between current and future earnings, it is recommended that investors and financial analysts pay
sufficient attention to the incentives that affect earnings management because decision-making is
based on managed earnings. May not lead to good results; Therefore, according to the results of
this study, investors and financial analysts are advised to pay more attention to the performance
of investment funds in the IPOs and after, because if they can, by examining the incentives of
well-performing funds in the IPOs. This will lead to abnormal profits for the stakeholders. Profits
will be incremental, which in the next periods of activity will have an adverse effect on
performance results and therefore gain unusual losses for investors.