پديد آورندگان :
راشدي، رزيتا داﻧﺸﮕﺎه آزاد اﺳﻼﻣﯽ واﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮان ﺷﻤﺎل، ﺗﻬﺮان، اﯾﺮان , شكري، محمد داﻧﺸﮕﺎه آزاد اﺳﻼﻣﯽ واﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮان ﺷﻤﺎل - گروه فلسفه، ﺗﻬﺮان، اﯾﺮان , مرادخاني، علي داﻧﺸﮕﺎه آزاد اﺳﻼﻣﯽ واﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮان ﺷﻤﺎل - گروه فلسفه، ﺗﻬﺮان، اﯾﺮان
كليدواژه :
ﺳﻮﺑﮋﮐﺘﯿﻮﯾﺘﻪ , ﺑﯿﻦ اﻻذﻫﺎﻧﯽ , ﮐﺎﻧﺖ و ذوق , ﻧﻈﺮﯾﻪ ذوق ﮐﺎﻧﺖ
چكيده فارسي :
ﮐﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺖ اﺣﮑﺎم زﯾﺒﺎﺷﻨﺎﺧﺘﯽ را ذوﻗﯽ ﻣﯽداﻧﺪ اﻣﺎ درﻋﯿﻦ ﺣﺎل ﺑﺮ اﯾﻦ ﺑﺎور اﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ ﻣﯽﺗﻮان ﻣﺒﻨﺎﯾﯽ ﻋﯿﻨـﯽ ﺑﺮاي ﮐﻠﯿﺖ اﯾﻦ اﺣﮑﺎم در ﻗﻮه ﺣﮑﻢ ﯾﺎﻓﺖ. اﯾﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﮐـﻪ ﺑـﻪ روش ﺗﻮﺻـﯿﻔﯽ – ﺗﺤﻠﯿﻠـﯽ ﻓـﺮاﻫﻢ آﻣـﺪه اﺳـﺖ ﻣﯽ ﮐﻮﺷﺪ ﺑﻪ دو ﭘﺮﺳﺶ اﺻﻠﯽ در ﺧﺼﻮص ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮥ اﺣﮑﺎم ذوﻗﯽ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ ﭘﺎﺳﺦ دﻫﺪ:
ﻧﺨﺴﺖ اﯾﻨﮑﻪ، ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻪ وﺟﻮد ﺗﻮأﻣﺎنِ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﺳﻮﺑﮋﮐﺘﯿﻮ و ﺑﯿﻦ اﻻذﻫﺎﻧﯽ در ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮥ ذوق ﮐﺎﻧﺖ، او ﭼﻪ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﯽ ﻣﯿـﺎن ﺣﯿﺚ ﺳﻮﺑﮋﮐﺘﯿﻮ و ﺣﯿﺚ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻻذﻫﺎﻧﯽ ﺣﮑﻢ ذوﻗﯽ ﺑﺮﻗﺮار ﻣﯽ ﮐﻨﺪ؟ ﺑﺮاي ﭘﺎﺳﺦ ﺑﻪ اﯾﻦ ﭘﺮﺳﺶ، در ﺑﺨﺶ اول، ﺿـﻤﻦ ﺑﺮرﺳﯽ وﯾﮋﮔﯽ ﻫﺎي ﻣﻨﻄﻘﯽ ﺣﮑﻢ ذوﻗﯽ ﻧﺸﺎن ﻣـﯽ دﻫـﯿﻢ ﮐـﻪ اﯾـﻦ ﺣﮑـﻢ، از ﻧﻈـﺮ ﮐﺎﻧـﺖ ، از ﺳـﻮﯾﯽ، ﻧـﻮﻋﯽ ﺣﮑـﻢ زﯾﺒﺎﺷﻨﺎﺧﺘﯽ اﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ ﺻﺪور آن در آزادي و ﺧﻮدآﯾﯿﻨﯽ ﮐﺎﻣﻞ ﺳﻮژه ﺻﻮرت ﻣﯽ ﮔﯿﺮد و از ﺳﻮي دﯾﮕﺮ، ﻧﻮع ﺧﺎﺻﯽ از اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﮐﻠﯽ را در ﻣﺤﺘﻮاي ﺧﻮد دارد. اﯾﻦ ﻧﻮع ﺧﺎص از اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﮐﻠﯽ، از آن ﺟﺎ ﮐﻪ ﺻـﺮﻓﺎ ﺑـﺮ ﺳـﺎﺧﺘﺎرﻫﺎي اﺳـﺘﻌﻼﯾﯽ و ﻣﺸﺘﺮك ﻣﯿﺎن ﺗﻤﺎم ﺳﻮژه ﻫﺎي ﺣﮑﻢ ﮐﻨﻨﺪه اﺳﺘﻮار اﺳﺖ، ﺣﯿﺜﯽ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻻذﻫﺎﻧﯽ ﻧﯿﺰ دارد ﮐﻪ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ آن را ﺑـﻪ ﻧـﺎم ﻫـﺎي ﮐﻠﯿﺖ ﺳﻮﺑﮋﮐﺘﯿﻮ، ﮐﻠﯿﺖ زﯾﺒﺎﺷﻨﺎﺧﺘﯽ و اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻫﻤﮕﺎﻧﯽ ﻣﯽ ﺧﻮاﻧﺪ. دوم اﯾﻨﮑﻪ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ ﭼﮕﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﯿﺎن ﺣﯿـﺚ ﺳـﻮﺑﮋﮐﺘﯿﻮ و ﺣﯿﺚ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻻذﻫﺎﻧﯽ ﺣﮑﻢ ذوﻗﯽ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﺮﻗﺮار ﻣﯽ ﮐﻨﺪ؟ ﺑﺮاي ﭘﺎﺳﺦ ﺑﻪ اﯾﻦ ﭘﺮﺳﺶ، در ﺑﺨﺶ دوم ﻣﺪﻟﻞ ﻣﯽ ﮐﻨﯿﻢ ﮐﻪ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ، اﮔﺮﭼﻪ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﺑﻪ ﺳﻮﺑﮋﮐﺘﯿﻮ ﺑﻮدن ﺣﮑﻢ ذوﻗﯽ اﺳﺖ اﻣﺎ اﯾﻦ ﺳﻮﺑﮋﮐﺘﯿﻮﯾﺘﻪ را از ﻧﻮﻋﯽ ﺧـﺎص ﻣـﯽ داﻧـﺪ ﮐـﻪ ﺑـﯿﻦ اﻻذﻫﺎﻧﯽ، وﺟﻪ دﯾﮕﺮ آن اﺳﺖ. ﺑﺮاي اﯾﻦ ﻣﻨﻈﻮر اﺑﺘﺪا ﺳﻌﯽ ﻣﯽ ﮐﻨﯿﻢ ﻣﻌﻨﺎي ﺳﻮﺑﮋﮐﺘﯿﻮﯾﺘﮥ ﺧﺎص ﺣﮑﻢ ذوﻗﯽ را ﺷﺮح دﻫﯿﻢ و ﺳﭙﺲ وﺟﻪ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻻذﻫﺎﻧﯽ اﯾﻦ ﻣﻌﻨﺎي ﺧﺎص را روﺷﻦ ﮐﻨﯿﻢ.
در آﺧﺮ ﻧﯿﺰ ﻧﺸﺎن ﻣﯽ دﻫﯿﻢ ﮐﻪ ﮐﺎﻧﺖ ﺑﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﺎي اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺑﯿﻦ اﻻذﻫﺎﻧﯽ اي ﮐﻪ در اﺣﮑﺎم ذوﻗﯽ ﻣﯽ ﯾﺎﺑﺪ، ﻗﻮة ذوق را ﻗﺎﺑﻠﯿﺘﯽ ﺑﺮاي ﻫﻤﺪﻟﯽ ﻣﯿﺎن ﺳﻮژه ﻫﺎ و ﺑﯿﺮون ﮐﺸﯿﺪن آﻧﻬﺎ از اﻧﺰوا ﻣﯽ داﻧﺪ.
چكيده لاتين :
Kant considers the nature of rules of the taste to be interested, but at the same time believes that an objective basis can be found for the totality of these rulings in the power of judgment. First, given the coexistence of subjective and intersubjective elements in Kant's theory of interest, what relation does he establish between the subjective and the intersubjective judgments of taste? To answer this question, in the first part, while examining the logical features of the aesthetical sentence, we show that this sentence, in his view, is an aesthetic sentence that is issued in complete freedom and autonomy of the subject and by the other has a certain kind of general validity in its content. This kind of general validity, since it is purely based on transcendental structures which are common among all judgmental subjects, also has an intersubjective aspect, which Kant calls the names of subjective generality, aesthetic generality, and universal validity. Second, how does Kant strike a relation between the subjective and the intersubjective? To answer this question, in the second part, we argue that Kant, although he believes in the subjectivity of the judgment of taste, considers this subjectivity to be of a special kind, which is the other aspect of intersubjectivity. For this purpose, we first try to explain the meaning of the subjectivity of the judgment of interest, and then to clarify the intersubjective aspect of this meaning. Finally, we show that Kant, based on the intersubjective validity he finds in the judgment of interest, considers the faculty of interest as a capacity for empathy between subjects and to bring them out of isolation.
