عنوان مقاله :
اﺛﺮ ﺗﻤﺮﮐﺰ ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ ﻧﻬﺎدي ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻞ، دوره ﺗﺼﺪي ﻣﺪﯾﺮﻋﺎﻣﻞ و رﻗﺎﺑﺖ ﺑﺎزار ﻣﺤﺼﻮل ﺑﺮ راﺑﻄﻪ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻏﻔﺎل ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪﮔﺬاران ﻧﻬﺎدي ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻞ و ﻋﺪم ﺷﻔﺎﻓﯿﺖ اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎ
عنوان به زبان ديگر :
The Effect of Passive Institutional Ownership Focus, CEO Tenure and Product Market Competition on the Relationship between Distracted Passive Institutional Investors and Firms Transparency
پديد آورندگان :
ﺑﺪﯾﻌﯽ ﻧﮋاد، ﻋﻠﯽ داﻧﺸﮕﺎه آزاد اﺳﻼﻣﯽ واﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮان ﻣﺮﮐﺰي - ﮔﺮوه ﺣﺴﺎﺑﺪاري، ﺗﻬﺮان، اﯾﺮان , ﺗﻮاﻧﮕﺮ ﺣﻤﺰه ﮐﻼﺋﯽ، اﻓﺴﺎﻧﻪ داﻧﺸﮕﺎه آزاد اﺳﻼﻣﯽ واﺣﺪ ﺗﻬﺮان ﻣﺮﮐﺰي - ﮔﺮوه ﺣﺴﺎﺑﺪاري، ﺗﻬﺮان، اﯾﺮان
كليدواژه :
ﺗﻤﺮﮐﺰ ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ ﻧﻬﺎدي ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻞ , اﻏﻔﺎل ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪﮔﺬاران ﻧﻬﺎدي ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻞ , ﺷﻔﺎﻓﯿﺖ اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ , دوره ﺗﺼﺪي ﻣﺪﯾﺮﻋﺎﻣﻞ و رﻗﺎﺑﺖ ﺑﺎزار ﻣﺤﺼﻮل
چكيده فارسي :
اﻓﺸﺎي اﻃﻼﻋﺎت، ﻧﻘﺶ اﺳﺎﺳﯽ در ﺗﺼﻤﯿﻢﮔﯿﺮيﻫﺎي ﺻﺤﯿﺢ و آﮔﺎﻫﺎﻧﻪ ﮔﺮوهﻫﺎي ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ اﺳﺘﻔﺎدهﮐﻨﻨﺪه ﺑﻪوﯾﮋه
ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪﮔﺬاران دارد اﻣﺎ واﺣﺪﻫﺎي اﻗﺘﺼﺎدي ﺑﺪون ﻓﺸﺎرﻫﺎي ﺧﺎرج از ﺳﺎزﻣﺎن و اﻟﺰاﻣﺎت ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﯽ و ﺣﺮﻓﻪاي، ﺗﻤﺎﯾﻠﯽ ﺑﻪ اﻓﺸﺎي
ﮐﺎﻓﯽ اﻃﻼﻋﺎت ﻧﺪارﻧﺪ زﯾﺮا اﻓﺸﺎي اﻃﻼﻋﺎت ﻫﺰﯾﻨﻪﺑﺮ اﺳﺖ. اﯾﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ اﻏﻔﺎل ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺳﻬﺎﻣﺪاران ﻧﻬﺎدي ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﺮ ﺷﻔﺎﻓﯿﺖ
اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎ را ﺑﺎ در ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻦ ﺳﻄﺢ ﺗﻤﺮﮐﺰ ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ ﻧﻬﺎدي ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻞ، رﻗﺎﺑﺖ ﺑﺎزار ﻣﺤﺼﻮل و دوره ﺗﺼﺪي ﻣﺪﯾﺮﻋﺎﻣﻞ
ﺑﺮرﺳﯽ ﻣﯽﮐﻨﺪ. در اﯾﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﺑﺎ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده از دادهﻫﺎي 150 ﺷﺮﮐﺖ از ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎي ﭘﺬﯾﺮﻓﺘﻪﺷﺪه در ﺑﻮرس اوراق ﺑﻬﺎدار ﺑﻪ
ﺑﺮرﺳﯽ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﭘﺮداﺧﺘﻪ ﺷﺪ. ﺑﺮاي آزﻣﻮن ﻓﺮﺿﯿﻪﻫﺎي ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ از ﻣﺪلﻫﺎي رﮔﺮﺳﯿﻮﻧﯽ ﭼﻨﺪ ﻣﺘﻐﯿﺮه ﺑﺎ روش داده ﺗﺎﺑﻠﻮﯾﯽ
و روﯾﮑﺮد اﺛﺮات ﺛﺎﺑﺖ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده ﮔﺮدﯾﺪ. ﻧﺘﺎﯾﺞ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ از آزﻣﻮن ﻓﺮﺿﯿﻪﻫﺎي ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﻧﺸﺎن داد ﮐﻪ اﻏﻔﺎل ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪﮔﺬاران
ﻧﻬﺎدي ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻞ ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ ﻣﻨﻔﯽ و ﻣﻌﻨﺎداري ﺑﺮ ﺷﻔﺎﻓﯿﺖ اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎ دارد و ﻋﻠﯽرﻏﻢ اﯾﻦﮐﻪ ﺗﻤﺮﮐﺰ ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪﮔﺬاران
ﻧﻬﺎدي ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻞ در دو ﺳﻄﺢ ﺗﻤﺮﮐﺰ ﺑﯿﺸﺘﺮ از 5% و ﺗﻤﺮﮐﺰ ﺑﯿﺸﺘﺮ از 15%، ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ ﻣﺜﺒﺖ و ﻣﻌﻨﺎداري ﺑﺮ ﺷﻔﺎﻓﯿﺖ اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ
ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎ دارﻧﺪ ﻟﯿﮑﻦ اﻏﻔﺎل ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪﮔﺬاران ﻧﻬﺎدي ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻞ ﺗﻨﻬﺎ در ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎي داراي ﺳﻄﺢ ﺗﻤﺮﮐﺰ ﻣﺎﻟﮑﯿﺖ ﻧﻬﺎدي
ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﯿﺸﺘﺮ از 15%، ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ ﻣﻨﻔﯽ و ﻣﻌﻨﺎداري ﺑﺮ ﺷﻔﺎﻓﯿﺖ اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎ دارد. ﻫﻤﭽﻨﯿﻦ، ﺑﺮ اﺳﺎس ﻧﺘﺎﯾﺞ آزﻣﻮن
ﻓﺮﺿﯿﻪﻫﺎي ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ، اﻏﻔﺎل ﺗﻮﺟﻪ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪﮔﺬاران ﻧﻬﺎدي ﻣﻨﻔﻌﻞ در ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎي داراي ﻣﺪﯾﺮان ﻋﺎﻣﻞ ﺟﺪﯾﺪ، ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ ﻣﺜﺒﺖ و
ﻣﻌﻨﺎداري ﺑﺮ ﺷﻔﺎﻓﯿﺖ اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎ دارد وﻟﯽ در ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎي داراي رﻗﺎﺑﺖ ﺳﻄﺢ ﺑﺎزار ﻣﺤﺼﻮل، ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ ﻣﻌﻨﺎداري ﺑﺮ
ﺷﻔﺎﻓﯿﺖ اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ ﺷﺮﮐﺖﻫﺎ ﻧﺪارد.
چكيده لاتين :
Disclosure of information plays a key role in the correct and informed decisions of various user groups, especially investors, but economic units without external pressures and legal and professional requirements, are reluctant to disclose sufficient information because disclosure of information is costly(Pourheidari, and.Foroughi, 2019).This study examines the effect of distracted passive institutional shareholders on firm transparency by considering the level of concentration of passive institutional ownership, product market competition and the tenure of the CEO.In this study, using data from 150 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, the issue was investigated.To test the research hypotheses, multivariate regression models were used with panel data method and fixed effects approach.The results of testing the research hypotheses showed that distracted passive institutional investors has negative and significant effect on the firm transparency and despite the fact that the ownership concentration of passive institutional investors in both levels of concentration more than 5% and concentration more than 15% have aposotive and significant Have a posotive and significant effect on firm transparency, but distrated institutional investors only in companies with a level of passive institutional ownership concentration of more than 15%, has a negative and significant effect on companies' with information transparency.Also, based on the results of testing research hypotheses, Distractedpassive institutional investors in companies with new CEOs has a posotive and significant effect on the firmstransparency,However, in companies with competitive product market level, it does not have a significant effect on companies' firm transparency.
عنوان نشريه :
پژوهش هاي حسابداري مالي و حسابرسي