مقايسه نگرش صدرالمتالهين و ابن سينا در مسيله اتحاد عاقل و معقول

A Comparison of Mulla Sadra and Ibn-Sinaʹs Views on the Union of the Intellect and the Intelligible

The disagreements between Mulla Sadra and Ibn-Sina concerning the issue of the union of the intellect and the intelligible represent an example of the difference between the conceptions of two prominent Islamic philosophers of an important philosophical problem. Two completely contrasting theories have been ascribed to lbn-Sina in this regard. Some of his words indicate his rejection of the union of the intellect and the intelligible, while some of his other words indicate his confirmation of this theory. Conversely, Mulla Sadra is a great supporter of this theory and has adduced various arguments to demonstrate it. The theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible, which is either denied or accepted by Ibn-Sina, is not in harmony with the one supported by Mulla Sadra, and the views of these two phi;osThers concerning this theory are totally different from each other. ʹ1 heir disagreements can be summarized in two points: 1. Reality of intellection: According to Ibn-Sina, intellection means the perception of concepts, limits, and nature of objects in terms of their mental existence, and acquiring the form of objects in an abstract existent, whether the soul or the intellect. According to Mulla Sadra, intellection means the presence of the existence of an object before the perceiver; a pure existence which is free from non-existence and privation. 2. Reality of the union: In Ibn-Sinaʹs view, the union of the intellect and the intelligible, as viewed by its advocates, means the change of the soul into the intellect at the time of intellection. He believes that this theory is not demonstrable (and, of course, he sometimes defends it). Nevertheless, in Mulla Sadraʹs view, the soul is perfected at the time of intellection, and without leaving its existential status, can contemplate the intellectual forms and luminous existents in the world of the intellects and unite with them. Considering the above two points of difference between these two philosophers, we can say that their conceptions of the union of the intellect and the intelligible are so different from each other that they represent the intellectual confrontation between them much deeper than what it really is.