پل هورويچ؛ تيوري حداقلي صدق و مسيلة واقع گرايي علمي

Paul Horwich: Minimalist Theory of Truth and Scientific Realism

In philosophy, the concept of truth has been always discussed through the debates about the semantic dimension and the definition of realism and anti-realism ; however, none of these definitions are considered to be a complete one and none satisfies all philosopherʹs expectations. Most of the theories whose innovators have thought of them to be a realist, appear to be anti-realist according other philosophers. In this article a fundamental definition of realism is presented which is based on the approach of a philosopher. Minimalist theory of truth is a deflationary theory presented by Paul Horwich. By using minimal theoretic concepts, this theory can explain the application of the predicate "...is true". In this article three claims are investigated; first, the argument that the minimalist theory is the possible minimal theory regarding truth theories and it should be included in all theories of truth. The second claim is that if a philosopher suspects the consistency of autonomy of theoretical facts and their accessibility , his theory would be anti-realism, whether he intends to solve that problem or not; but, a realist philosopher doesnʹt see such a problem. The third claim is that if such a definition of realism is accepted, it shows that there is no relation between a theory of truth and realism; and, although this independency of the concept of truth from realism is correct concerning the minimalist theory of truth, but it should be accepted by realists because it can explain all the appearances and applications of truth predicate in all other definitions of realism.