كليدواژه :
دكارت , تمايز جوهري , اتحاد جوهري , ذهن , بدن
چكيده لاتين :
According to Descartesʹ metaphysics there are two different kinds of substances in the world of creatures: "thinking substance" and "extended substance" or soul and matter. In Descartesʹ philosophy the soul is equal to the mind and considered as a "thinking substance". This immaterial substance is the essence of the human being. Body, being considered as a "matter", is an "extended substance" and entirely distinct from the soul. The soul, therefore, exists and may be known prior to body and, not being corporeal, can exist after human death. Hence, Descartes can prove the immortality of human soul in the framework of the principle of substantial distinction. On the other hand, as a physiologist and psychologist, Descartes indeed believes in mind-body union, so that some causal interactions between mind and body show their substantial union. In this essay, the authors show that Descartes faces a serious problem in combining substantial union of mind and body with their substantial distinction; despite of his efforts in introducing the idea of pineal gland, the problem remains unsolved. Therefore it seems that as he cannot dispense with his only reason for proving the immortality of human soul, he has to hold the mind-body distinction theory in his metaphysics. Indeed, Descartes prefers to support the distinction theory rather than union theory in confronting a thesis and an antithesis stating one of two theories.
