بررسي رابطه بين مالكيت اصلي و محافظه كاري در سود

اين تحقيق به بررسي اثر ساختار مالكيت بر محافظه‌كاري در سود پرداخته است. ميزان استفاده از روشهاي محافظه‌كارانه براي شناسايي بموقع زيان و كاهش عدم تقارن اطلاعاتي به دو موضوع بستگي دارد: 1- ميزان سهام سهامدار كنترل كننده، 2- انحراف بين حق راي و حق جريان وجوه نقد1 آنها. در اين مقاله از الگوي بسط يافته باسو 2(1997) براي تجزيه و تحليل موضوع و 56 شركت حايز شرايط براي دوره زماني 87-1383 استفاده شد. به طور كلي نتايج تحقيق بيانگر رابطه منفي بين ميزان مالكيت سهامدار كنترل‌كننده و سطح محافظه‌كاري در سود است. اين نتيجه با كاهش سطح قراردادهاي برون سازماني سازگار است. به علاوه، بين اين انحراف با محافظه‌كاري در سود رابطه منفي به دست آمد. زماني كه اين تفاوت افزايش مي‌يابد، شركت با هزينه‌هاي زيادتر قراردادهاي برون سازماني روبه رو مي‌شود.

The conflict of interest between managers and stockholders is one of the salient matters in economics, finance and accounting. One of the ways for resolving this conflict is the timely loss recognition. Many factors have impact on timely loss recognition. In this paper, we investigated the effect of ownership structure on Earnings conservatism, and analyzed whether the extent of timely loss recognition shown by firms with a controlling owner for the purpose of decreasing the information asymmetries depends on 1) the ownership share of controlling owner and 2) the divergence between controlling ownerʹs voting and cash flow rights. In this paper, we have used an extension of the regression proposed by Basu (1997) for analyzing the data and 56 companies during 2005-09 from database. In general, our results document a negative relationship between the ownership share of controlling owner and the level of earnings conservatism and this result is consistent with the reduction of external contracting. In addition, we also find a negative relationship between earnings conservatism and the divergence of controlling ownerʹs voting and cash flow rights. By increasing this divergence, firm is confronted with higher costs of external contracting.