پديد آورندگان :
شهبازي‌نيا، مرتضي نويسنده استاديار دانشگاه تربيت‌مدرس shabazinia, morteza , سجادي، كمال نويسنده دانشگاه آزاد اسلامي ميمه ,
كليدواژه :
اطلاعات پيش‌قراردادي , اطلاعات قرارداري , تعهد به افشاي اطلاعات اساسي , قرارداد فرانشيز
چكيده فارسي :
تعهد به افشاي اطلاعات اساسي از لحاظ نظري و عملي حايز اهميت است. به اين معنا
كه براي برخورداري از آگاهي لازم براي نيل به تصميم گيري و انعقاد قرارداد اطلاعاتي كه
در ايجاد رضاي سالم قراردادي موثر است بايد در اختيار طرف مقابل قرار داده شود. در
قرارداد فرانشيز تخلف از اين تكليف كه از لوازم و ضروريات حس ننيت در مرحله مذاكره،
انعقاد و اجراي قرارداد است تاثير بسزايي در روابط حقوقي طرفين ب هجا مي گذارد. در اين
مقاله ضمن تعيين حدود تعهد فوق، ضمان تاجرا يهاي تخلف از آن در حقوق ايران مورد
بررسي قرار مي گيرد.
چكيده لاتين :
Inspection of a company may be internal and or external. On the problems concerning
inspection regime of the companies, some authors have developed some views
which all are not approved. Getting abandoned section 144 of the commerce amendment
Act of 1969 implemented is by some deemed as strengthening the inspection
in public limited companies. But that useless action if applied would result in state
intervention in company affairs, increase in bureaucracy in formation and operation
of them, imposing charges to them and therefore to consumers and lead in spreading
of commercial secrets among the companies. In addition to natural persons, judicial
persons (auditing institutes) as well are allowed to undertake the legal inspection of
the state and public companies but private companies (other than cooperatives) can
merely appoint natural persons as inspectors. The contract between a company and
its inspector is an “inspection contract” to which the regulations contained in the
articles of association, resolutions of the general assemblies, regulations specifically
designed by law for inspectors and laws on the agency contract are respectively applicable.
It is a revocable contract and dismissal of the inspector is not subject to
proving the inspector’s fault and of course, it should not be so. General assemblies
may in addition to the inspector deploy an expert or some experts to investigate the
affairs of the company and operations of the managers. In case, there was such a right
for holders of a fixed amount of stock, e.g. holders of 10 % of the capital, the problem
on deprivation of the minority stockholders from having a share in management of
the company could be to some extent solved. In English law, there is no legal duty for
appointment of inspectors by the companies. Instead, department of trade and industry is to make investigations required in the affairs of the companies. In Iran, making
such a control in respect to the private companies lay on the registrar of companies,
stock exchange organization, guilds and their unions. Beneficiary also looks after the
operation of the company through the court. External inspection to the operations
of the state and public companies lays on the general inspection organization, the
supreme audit court and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. The general
inspection organization looks also after the operation of the public companies. In
Iran, companies’ inspection regime has faced with only a few acceptable criticisms
which can be adhered by tiny amendments into related Acts. Iranian taught authors
sympathetic to external inspection regime, have ignored that the countries following
that regime lack the internal inspection requirement for their companies. Applying
both these regimes altogether is not common, and entering external regime into Iranian
legal system, with regard to its various financial and administrative charges, is
not at all advisable.
