چكيده لاتين :
The dispute between realists and antirealists in the philosophy of science
has been a heated one on both sides of the English Channel. Analytic
and Continental philosophers alike have been engaged in attempting to
sort out the ramifications and implications of scientific practice. Camps
have been formed, sides demarcated, ink spilled. Despite Arthur Fine’s
proclamation, in the 1980s, that “Realism is dead,” it seems still to thrive in
various philosophical pockets: its defenders still write, its critics still read.
Likewise, the antirealist challenge to realism has not conceded an inch.
the dispute does indeed seem intractable. This intractability is frustrating
to virtually everyone involved. To respond to such an intractability, there
are in general three options. I will discuss these options I will employ the
third option. I will do so using the work of both Arthur Fine and the
early Heidegger. Specifically, I will claim that Fine’s position is in essence
a Heideggerian view of ontology. The Natural Ontological Attitude (or
NOA) is nothing more than a recognition of the reality of things as they
appear to human beings, concernfully absorbed in the world. To theorize
about ontology in a way that goes beyond our phenomenology is to
do philosophy irresponsibly. It is doing philosophy irresponsibly, I will
contend, that generates a realist/antirealist dispute.
