از كاركردگرايي تا بسترگرايي: بازسازيِ گفتگوي دريفوس و پاتنم

From Functionalism To Contextualism: Reconstructing Dialogue Between Dreyfus And Putnam

در 1960 پاتنم در مقاله "اذهان و ماشين‌ها" بر پايه قياسِ ميانِ ذهن و ماشينِ تورينگ نگرشي نو به ذهن به نام كاركردگرايي را پي‌ريزي نمود. يك دهه پس از آن دريفوس براساسِ تفسيرش از پديدارشناسيِ مرلوپونتي و هيدگر كاركردگراييِ پاتنم را نقد كرد. دريفوس نشان داد كه نمي‌توان ذهن را به مثابه ماشيني تورينگ به شمار آورد كه با بهره‌گيري از قواعدي صوري كار مي‌كند و ورودي و خروجي‌هايش عناصري فارغ از بستر هستند. دو دهه بعد پاتنم بر پايه شكست كارنپ در صوري‌سازي استقرا، چرخش به سوي كل‌گرايي و خارجيت‌گرايي معناشناختيِ خودش از نگرشِ كاركردگرايانه- محاسبه‌گرايانه‌ در فلسفه ذهن دست كشيد و به نگرشي خارجيت‌گرا- بسترگرايانه روي آورد. نقدي كه پاتنم بر پايه آن كاركردگرايي را از ريشه نادرست دانسته بود همان نقدي بود كه دريفوس سال‌ها پيش بر وي وارد آورده بود. در اين مقاله گفتگوي نقادانه ميانِ دريفوس و پاتنم بازسازي مي‌شود و بر پايه آن نشان داده مي‌شود كه فيزيكاليسم به مثابه نظريه‌اي در بابِ ذهن نادرست است و به جاي آن "سوژه‌اي در جهان" الگوي مناسبي را براي ذهن فراهم مي‌آورد.

Putnamʹs 1960 article, "Minds and Machines", sketched a novel approach to the mind based on the analogy between mental states and logical-computational state of Turing machine, which later acknowledged as functionalism. Based on his interpretation of the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, Dreyfus criticized Putnam’s functionalist-computationalist approach to the mind in an article directly addressing to him. In both physical and psychological-phenomenological level, Dreyfus proposes that mind can’t be understood as Turing machine which works with formal rules and in which inputs and outputs are context-free and independent of environment. About three decades after his article "minds and machines", according to Carnap’s failure to formulate induction and Quine’s holism and also based on his semantic externalism, Putnam rejected his functionalist-computationalist approach and accepted an externalist-contextualist approach. Although Putnam does not mention the name of Dreyfus, his criticism to reject functionalism was obviously resembling the one Dreyfus stated previously contrary to the functionalism. In this paper, in order to reconstruct the critical dialogue between Dreyfus and Putnam, first, functionalism is formulated in the works of Putnam. After that, the phenomenological critique of Dreyfus to Putnam is stated. Then, it is shown that the causes of Putnam’s turning from functionalism to contextual point of view were thoroughly similar to Dreyfus’s critics to him. Last, it is shown that based on this turning from functionalism to contextualism, physicalism as a theory of mind is challenged and instead “subject in the world” provides a better model of the mind.