رابطه سازوكارهاي حاكميت شركتي با هزينه‌هاي نمايندگي متشكل از شركت‌هاي ايراني

The Relationship of Corporate Governance Mechanisms with Costs of the Agencies of Iranian Companies

هدف اين مقاله آزمون اثر مكانيسم‌هاي حاكميت شركتي بر هزينه‏هاي نمايندگي در نمونه‌اي متشكل از شركت‏هاي ايراني است. مقاله حاضر اثر مكانيسم‌هاي حاكميت شركتي بر دو پراكسي متفاوت از هزينه‏هاي نمايندگي، يعني فروش كل به دارايي كل (گردش دارايي) و نسبت هزينه‏هاي عملياتي به فروش كل را بررسي مي‏كند. از بين سازوكارهاي كنترل هزينه‌هاي نمايندگي درصد اعضاي غيرموظف هييت‌مديره و درصد سرمايه‏گذاران نهادي، به عنوان متغير مستقل، بررسي شده‏اند. تحليل و بررسي همبستگي با استفاده از رگرسيون مقطعي صورت گرفته است. يافته‌هاي تحقيق نشان مي‏دهد، در صورت استفاده از نسبت گردش دارايي به عنوان معياري براي اندازه‏گيري هزينه‏هاي نمايندگي، بين درصد اعضاي غيرموظف و هزينه‏هاي نمايندگي رابطه معناداري وجود دارد، اما اين رابطه براي سرمايه‏گذاران نهادي معنادار نيست.

This study attempts to investigate the impacts of several corporate governance mechanisms on two alternative proxies for agency costs, namely the ratio of total sales to total assets (asset turnover) and the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to total sales (SG&A). Agency costs, non-executive directors on the board, and institutional investors are dependent variables. The analysis is conducted by a cross-sectional regression approach. Findings of the research are different in regard to measuring scales of agency costs. There is significant relationship between non-executive directors and agency costs, in regard to asset turnover as a measuring scale, but this is not a significant relationship for institutional investors. By using the ratio of operational expenses to sales as measuring scale of agency costs, there is not also significant relationship between non-executive directors and agency costs, but this is significant relationship for institutional investors. In regard to combination of reverse ratio of asset turnover and ratio of operational expenses to sales as measuring scales of agency costs, there is significant relationship between non-executive directors and institutional investors with agency costs.