ادراكات اعتباري و نسبيت اخلاق در انديشه علامه طباطبايي

The Valid Conceptions and Relativity of Ethics in Allamah Tabatabai’s Thought

مفاهيمي همچون خوب و بايد، كه نماد مفاهيم ارزشي و لزومي اخلاق هستند، مفاهيمي اعتباري مي باشند. از خصوصيات بارز ادراكات اعتباري اين است كه اين گونه ادراكات، به يك معنا نسبي هستند. در پاسخ به اين سوال كه آيا اين گونه نسبيت، تعارضي با اطلاق و ثبات اخلاقي ندارد؟ بايد گفت: كمال موجود مبدا نهايي فعل اختياري انسان است و لذا اصول عام اخلاقي، از اعتباريات عمومي هستند كه لازمه نوعيت نوع مي باشند. از اين رو، كمال نوعي انسان، مبدا اصلي اعتبارخوب و وجوب اخلاقي است. ازآنجا كه كمال نوعي انسان به تبع ثبات در نوعيت نوع، ثابت است، اعتبارات اخلاقي كه ناظر به كمال ثابت نوع انساني هستند، تغيير نمي پذيرند.

After investigating the meaning of validity and relativity, this paper defines such concepts as, “good” and “must”, which are the symbols of axiological and obligatory concepts of ethics, are mentally posited concepts. One of the distinctive features of mentally posited concepts is that these kinds of conceptions are somehow relative. The question which arises here is whether or not this kind of relativity contradicts absoluteness and strength of morality? In answer to this question, we should say; the common perfection is the final origin of man’s volitional action. Therefore, we can say that the general ethical principles of validities are among the common validities which are necessary for the property of type. Therefore, we can conclude that human perfection in general is the main source of validity and moral obligation. Since, due to the constancy in property of type, man’s qualitative perfection is fixed ethical validities, which depend on the constant perfection of man, are unchangeable. Through using a theoretical_analytical approach, this paper discusses valid conceptions and relativity of ethics in Allamah Tabatabai’s thought.