Title of article :
Channel coordination under fairness concerns and nonlinear demand
Author/Authors :
Ozgun Caliskan-Demirag، نويسنده , , Youhua Frank Chen، نويسنده , , Jianbin Li b، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Pages :
6
From page :
1321
To page :
1326
Abstract :
The supply chain literature analyzing supplier–retailer contracts and channel coordination has typically focused on profit or revenue maximization as the members’ sole objective. In such settings, it is well known that a simple wholesale price contract is not effective in coordinating the channel due to double marginalization. Recently, Cui et al. [Cui, T.H., Raju, J.S., Zhang, Z.J., 2007. Fairness and channel coordination. Management Science 53 (8) 1303–1314] introduced the members’ fairness concerns into channel coordination. Assuming a linear demand function, the authors show that a coordinating wholesale price contract can be designed when only the retailer or both parties are concerned about fairness. In this paper, we extend the authors’ results to other nonlinear demand functions that are commonly used in the literature. Our analysis reveals that, compared to the linear demand, the exponential demand function requires less stringent conditions to achieve coordination when only the retailer is fairness-concerned.
Keywords :
fairness , Channel coordination , Stackelberg game , Wholesale price contract , Supply chain management
Journal title :
European Journal of Operational Research
Serial Year :
2010
Journal title :
European Journal of Operational Research
Record number :
1312994
Link To Document :
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