مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رساني علوم و فناوري - Karl Popper’s View of the Linguistic Turn of Analytic Philosophy

Abstract :

In this article it is argued that contrary to the widespread and mistaken belief, Karl Popper cannot be characterized as an analytic philosopher. The justification for this claim can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the identity, which is called analytic philosopher was mostly formed in the linguistic turn of analytic philosophy. This identity indeed marks a general conception about several meta-philosophical matters: the proper method of philosophy, borders of philosophical questions, nature of philosophical questions and the aim of philosophical inquiry. After a careful examination of Karl Popper’s views about these meta-philosophical matters we can see that his meta-philosophical views don’t cohere with the analytic meta-philosophical conception mentioned. Moreover Karl Popper’s meta-philosophical views can be understood as a firm rejection of this conception. This article consists of two parts to demonstrate this rejection. In the first part the conception, which has given rise to the identity called analytic philosopher is clarified through examining Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s meta-philosophical views. The second part of this article tries to clarify the meta-philosophical conception of Popper and his strict rejection of the analytic meta-philosophical conception of Wittgenstein and Carnap..