Title :
Auction in multi-path multi-hop routing
Author :
Su, Xueyuan ; Chan, Sammy ; Peng, Gang
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Yale Univ., New Haven, CT
fDate :
2/1/2009 12:00:00 AM
Abstract :
We model the multi-path multi-hop routing in networks with selfish nodes as an auction and provide a novel solution from the game-theoretical perspective. We design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strategy proofness, which alleviates the over-payment problem of the widely used VCG mechanism. Through theoretical analysis, the proposed protocol is shown to be effective.
Keywords :
game theory; multipath channels; protocols; telecommunication network routing; Nash equilibria; Vickrey-Clark-Groves payment mechanism; game-theoretical perspective; multipath multihop routing auction; protocol; Costs; Game theory; Internet; Load management; Nash equilibrium; Protocols; Robustness; Routing; Spread spectrum communication; Telecommunication traffic; Mechanism design, game theory, Nash equilibrium;
Journal_Title :
Communications Letters, IEEE
DOI :
10.1109/LCOMM.2009.082021
